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LABOR LAW-APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT UNDER SECTION 9 (b) OF THE 
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT-DETERMINATION REQUIRES NLRB To EXERCISE D1scRE-
TION-Petitioner union sought to represent maintenance and construction 
electricians employed by plate glass manufacturer at a new plant. How-
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ever, employer and intervenor union entered into an agreement extending 
to the new plant an existing contract covering employees at certain of em-
ployer's other plants. At hearings upon petitioner's application to deter-
mine the "appropriate" bargaining unit under criteria established by sec-
tion 9 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act,1 employer and intervenor urged that the 
highly integrated nature of the plant and the history of plantwide bargain-
ing at employer's other plants made a single bargaining unit covering all 
plant's employees the only appropriate one.2 Relying upon a previously 
developed rules which denied consideration of these elements in all but 
four industries,4 the Board granted petitioner's request for severance.5 
Nevertheless, employer refused to bargain with petitioner. Finding this 
refusal to be an unfair labor practice, the Board ordered employer to bar-
gain.a On petition for enforcement of the NLRB's order,7 held, enforce-
ment denied. Section 9 (b) (2) requires the Board to use discretion in 
every case, and it is arbitrary to attempt to exercise this discretion by the 
application of a discriminatory rule. NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 
(4th Cir. 1959) 270 F. (2d) 167, cert. den. 28 U.S. LAW WEEK 3217 (1960). 
The selection of standards to be used to determine the appropriate 
bargaining unit has plagued the NLRB since its inception. The Wagner 
Act, which created the Board, directed it to make this determination, but 
gave little indication of the criteria to be employed.8 A 1947 amendment 
added section 9 (b) (2)-a proviso which forbids the Board to "decide that 
any craft unit is inappropriate ... [because] ... a different unit has been 
1 Labor-1\fanagement Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 143, 29 U.S.C. (1958) §159 (b)(2). 
Section 9 (b) provides: "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure 
to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit 
appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft 
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, That the Board shall not . . . (2) 
decide any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a different 
unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the em-
ployees in the proposed craft vote against separate representation ...• " 
2 This argument is based upon National Tube Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948), noted, 61 
HARv. L. REv. 1457 (1948). A craft unit of bricklayers and apprentices in highly integrated 
basic steel industry was sought and denied. 
s This rule originated in American Potash & Chemical Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954), 
noted, 54 CoL. L. REv. 1159 (1954). 
4 Basic steel, wet milling, lumbering, and aluminum. See notes 2 supra and 12 infra. 
5 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1728 (1957). 
o Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 758 (1958). 
7 The petition was brought pursuant to §10 (e) of the Labor-Management Relations 
Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. (1958) §160 (e). This procedure, though awkward, is the 
only one by which the company can obtain judicial review, for the NLRB's initial deter-
mination is not reviewable. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). 
s Section 9 (b) of the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 at 453 (1935) provides: "The Board 
shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to employees the full benefit of their 
right to self organization and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the 
policies of this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be 
the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." The NLRB's decisions 
under this act are discussed in Rathbun, "Taft-Hartley Act and Craft Unit Bargaining," 
59 YALE L.J. 1023 at 1027 (1950). 
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established by a prior Board determination .... "9 The effect of this 
proviso was extensively examined in National Tube Co.,1° in which the 
Board held that the history of successful plantwide bargaining and the high 
state of integration in the basic steel industry made a craft unit undesirable. 
It found that neither the words of the new proviso nor its legislative history 
required a craft unit in every case, that the Board would, and should, con-
tinue to exercise discretion,11 and that the proviso did not prohibit the 
Board from considering bargaining history, but that it merely precluded 
the Board from making that history the sole basis of its determination. Sub-
sequently, craft units were found inappropriate, under the National Tube 
doctrine, in three other highly integrated industries,12 but allowed in less 
integrated ones.13 In 1954 the Board made a major policy reversal. In 
American Potash & Chemical Co.14 the NLRB concluded that the Na-
tional Tube doctrine foreclosed the possibility of craft severance and froze 
an entire industry into an industrial unit. Finding this "freeze" incon-
sistent with the purpose of the act, the Board re-examined the legislative 
history and decided that the act required an initial craft unit, or craft 
severance, in every case where the prerequisites for separate representation 
are present.1 5 However, the NLRB announced that craft units would 
continue to be denied in those four industries in which they had previously 
been denied.1 6 The court in the principal case is the first court since the 
Board's about-face in the American Potash case to examine comprehensively 
and interpret secion 9 (b) (2).17 The Fourth Circuit, like the Board in 
National Tube, found the section unambiguous. The court concluded that 
the new provision does not limit the NLRB's discretion; it simply precludes 
basing a decision upon a prior determination and commands the Board to 
9 Note 1 supra. 
10 Note 2 supra. 
11 Under the Wagner Act the Board had exercised broad discretion in determining 
the appropriate bargaining unit. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 
416 (1947). 
12 Permanente Metals Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 804 (1950) (aluminum industry); Weyer-
hauser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1949) (lumbering industry); Com Products Refining 
Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 362 (1948) (wet milling industry). See also Carbide & Chemical Co., 102 
N.L.R.B. 1175 (1953) (a single chemical plant). 
13 E.g., Kellogg Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 302 (1953) (dry milling plant); Ford Motor Co., 100 
N.L.R.B. 813 (1952) (automobile engine plant). 
14 Note 3 supra. 
15 "In the view of the Board's majority [in American Potash], the Congressional intent 
requires that once the prerequisites for separate representation are present-viz., true craft 
status of the group and traditional craft experience of the proposed representative-the 
Board must afford the group an opportunity to decide the issue of separate representation 
for itself." NLRB, NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 39 (1955). Thus the Board decided that 
it would look at the employee group and their proposed representative, but would not 
attempt to balance this group's interest against those of management or the larger industrial 
group. 
16 American Potash & Chemical Co., note 3 supra, at 1422. 
17 Previously, Mueller Brass Co. v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 402, and New 
Bedford Loomfixers' Union v. Alpert, (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 723, had approved 
the interpretation of §9 (b) (2) reached by the Board in National Tube Co. 
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examine in each case all relevant factors. This interpretation is strength-
ened by comparing the language of section 9 (b) (1), which expressly forbids 
a unit containing unwilling professionals, with that of section 9 (b) (2), 
which does not expressly preclude the inclusion in a unit of unwilling craft 
employees. Nevertheless, some ambiguity does arise upon an examination 
of the section's legislative history. The Senate1 8 committee's majority re-
port states that the proviso is intended to leave "to the Board discretion to 
review all the facts in determining the appropriate unit. . . ."19 The 
minority views,20 too, believed it desirable for the Board to have discretion 
in this area, but feared none was allowed by the precise language of section 
9 (b) (2). In short, the entire committee agreed upon what the statute 
should say. Surely, even were the statute and its legislative history am-
biguous, this common desire of the legislators should control.21 In fact, 
the Board itself might not deny that it was vested with this discretion, for 
in the principal case the Board contended, in an alternative argument, 
that the American Potash doctrine was merely the embodiment of this 
discretion into a rule which was designed to effectuate the Board's policy. 
The court, conceding that in some circumstances an agency may carry out 
a statutory mandate in this manner, nevertheless found the Board's rule 
not only arbitrary because two industries could be precisely similar in bar-
gaining history and degree of integration and yet be treated differently, 
but also contrary to the commands of Congress because in dealing with 
four industries the Board's decisions are based solely upon past decisions 
in express defiance of section 9 (b) (2). Congress itself did not prescribe a 
rigid rule, for not only would it have been politically inexpedient to do so,22 
but also the nature of the problem does not lend itself to legislative fiat.23 
Whether the NLRB will accept the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of sec-
tion 9 (b) (2) and decide each case by an ad hoc exercise of its discretion24 
depends largely upon the Board itself, for it is not bound, at least in the 
other judicial circuits, by the court's decision. Moreover, there is a pos-
sibility that the Board could accept the court's interpretation, and yet 
18 The present language of §9 (b) (2) originated in S. 360, 80th Cong., 1st sess., §9 (b) (2) 
(1947). H.R. 3020, as reported, 80th Cong., 1st sess., §9 (f) (2) (1947), unequivocally gave 
craft employees the absolute right to separate representation. In conference, this provision 
was dropped in favor of the Senate's. 
19 s. Rep. 105, part I, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 12 (1947), 1 LEGISLATIVE HrsroRY OF THE 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Ac:r 418 (1948). Senator Taft, the author of this report, 
offered a similar explanation from the Senate floor: "It does not go the full way of giving 
them [craft employees] an absolute right in every case; it simply provides that the Board 
shall have discretion .... " 93 CoNG. REc. 3836 (1947). 
20 Minority Views on S. 1126, S. Rep. 105, part 2, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. I, IO (1947), 
1 LEGISLATIVE HrsrORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Ac:r 463, 472 (1948). 
21 For a fuller treatment of this legislative history, see Rathbun, "Taft-Hartley Act 
and Craft Union Bargaining Act," 59 YALE L.J. 1023 (1950). 
22 Id. at 1033. 
23See Mueller Brass Co. v. NLRB, note 17 supra. 
24 For a discussion of the important factors considered by the Board before American 
Potash to determine the appropriate bargaining unit, see "\V. C. Hamilton & Sons, 104 
N .L.R.B. 627 (1953), dissenting opinion. 
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continue to reach substantially the same results as would have been reached 
under the American Potash doctrine. It was not the determination itself, 
but rather the use of an improper legal standard as the basis for the 
determination, which caused the court in the principal case to deny en-
forcement. Were the same result to be placed squarely upon policy con-
siderations within the area of the Board's discretion, it would be virtually 
unassailable,25 for such decisions must stand unless clearly arbitrary26 or 
unsupported by "substantial evidence."27 The Board should, however, 
accept and apply the spirit and philosophy of the principal case, for unit 
determination is important to-and because of-many competing interests.28 
Only by a careful case-by-case balancing of these interests can the cause of 
industrial harmony best be served.29 
James N. Adler 
25 Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (SEC ruling reversed because it applied 
improper legal principles); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (same result affirmed 
where commission based decision on policy and experience). 
26 NLRB v. Grace Co., (8th Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 126 at 129; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., note 11 supra. 
27 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §160 (e). 
28 See, generally, Rathbun, "Taft-Hartley Act and Craft Union Bargaining," 59 YALE 
L.J. 1023 at 1025 (1950). 
29 See, generally, Rathbun, "Taft-Hartley Act and Craft Union Bargaining," 59 YALE L.J. 
1023 (1950); Cox, "Some Aspects of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947," 61 HAR.v. L. 
R.Ev. 274 at 303-304 (1948); Hearings before the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 
on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 2, p. 1915 (1947) (testimony of Herzog, 
chairman of the NLRB). 
